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Abstract 
Economic theory reduces the concept of rationality to internal consistency.  As far as beliefs are 
concerned, rationality is equated with having a prior belief over a “Grand State Space”, 
describing all possible sources of uncertainties.  We argue that this notion is too weak in some 
senses and too strong in others.  It is too weak because it does not distinguish between rational 
and irrational beliefs.  Relatedly, the Bayesian approach, when applied to the Grand State Space, 
is inherently incapable of describing the formation of prior beliefs.  On the other hand, this notion 
of rationality is too strong because there are many situations in which there is not sufficient 
information for an individual to generate a Bayesian prior.  It follows that the Bayesian approach 
is neither sufficient not necessary for the rationality of beliefs. 
1. Rationality of Belief and Belief Formation 
Economic theory is both the birthplace and the prime application of the rational choice 
paradigm.  Throughout the 20
th century, economics has relied on rationality, and refined 
the definition of rational choice, offering concepts such as subjective expected utility 
maximization and Nash equilibrium, which have proved useful in several other 
disciplines. 
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The paradigm of rational choice offers a notion of rationality that is much more flexible 
than the more traditional notions discussed in preceding centuries.  In the past, many 
writers expected Rationality to settle questions of faith, advance science, promote 
humanistic ideas, and bring peace on Earth.  Such writers did not shy away from arguing 
what is rational and what is not, and to take a stance regarding what Rational Man should 
do, believe, and aspire to. 
By contrast, economic theory in the 20
th century took a much more modest and relativist 
approach to rationality.  No longer was there a pretense to know what Rational Man 
should think or do.  Rather, rationality was reduced to various concepts of internal 
consistency.  For example, rational choice under certainty became synonymous with 
constrained maximization of a so-called utility function.  By and large, economic theory 
does not attempt to judge which utility functions make sense, reflect worthy goals, or lead 
to beneficial outcomes.  In essence, any utility function would suffice for an agent to be 
dubbed rational.  More precisely, utility functions might be required to satisfy some 
mathematical properties such as continuity, monotonicity, or quasi-concavity, but these 
do not impose any substantive constraints on the subjective tastes of the economic agents 
involved.  The mathematical properties of the utility function cannot imply, for instance, 
that it is irrational not to save for one’s retirement.  Defined solely on the abstract 
mathematical structure, these properties may be viewed as restricting the form of 
preferences, but not their content.   
This minimalist requirement has two main justifications.  The first is the desire to avoid 
murky and potentially endless discussions regarding the “true” nature of rationality.  The 
second is that such a weak requirement does not exclude from the economic discussion 
more modes of behavior than are absolutely necessary.  As a result, the theory is 
sufficiently general to be applied in a variety of contexts, for a wide variety of utility 
functions. 
In this paper we do not take issue with the notion of utility maximization or with the 
rationality of expected utility maximization given probabilistic beliefs over a state space.  
Our focus is on the existence of such beliefs and their justification.  Our point of 
departure is that, when addressing the question of rationality of belief, economic theory 
adopted the same modest approach it has employed for the question of rationality of 
tastes. 
In an attempt to avoid the question of what it is rational to believe, as well as not to rule 
out possibly strange beliefs, economic theory and decision theory have adopted a 
definition of rational beliefs that, like the definition of rational preferences, is based on 
internal consistency alone.  This highly subjective view dates back at least to de Finetti 
(1937).  In modern economic thought, a decision maker who satisfies Savage’s (1954) 
axioms, and behaves as if they entertain a prior probability over a state space, will be 3 
considered a rational decision maker under uncertainty, and may be viewed as having 
rational beliefs. 
Such a relativist notion of rationality of belief is not the standard notion of “Bayesianism” 
in philosophy or in statistics.
4  Moreover, even for economic theorists it is hardly 
intuitive.  Consider a graduate student who believes that he is among the best economists 
in the world.  Assume that he assigns probability 1 to this event, and that he takes 
decisions so as to maximize his expected utility with respect to these views.  In the face 
of new evidence (failing prelims for example), he employs Bayes’s rule to update his 
probability.  But since he ascribes zero probability to the event that he is not a supremely 
gifted economist, his updated beliefs are that his professors are simply not sufficiently 
smart to recognize the depth and importance of his ideas.  Throughout the process, the 
student may well satisfy all of Savage's axioms, as well as the implicit axiom of Bayesian 
updating.
5 Yet, we may agree that the student needs to be treated as delusional.  Indeed, 
in everyday parlance we make distinctions between rational and irrational beliefs, but 
decision theory is silent on this issue.
6 
Reducing rationality of utility to internal consistency may result from the ancient 
recognition that tastes are inherently subjective (de gustibus non est disputandum).  But 
one may say more about beliefs than about tastes.  Rationality does not constrain one to 
like or to dislike the smell of tobacco but rationality does preclude the belief that smoking 
has no negative health effects.  Similarly, a person who buys a painting may be wrong 
about the probability that it will be stolen, but not about which painting pleases her more.     
Defining rationality of beliefs by internal consistency alone allows the theory to apply to 
a wide array of beliefs.  But this generality might be costly.  First, when we refuse to 
address the question of which beliefs are rational, we may not notice certain regularities 
in the beliefs entertained by economic agents.  Second, by restricting attention to the 
coherence of beliefs, one evades the question of the generation of beliefs.  Indeed, 
economic theory offers no account of the belief formation process.  Beliefs are 
supposedly derived from observed behavior, but there is no description of how the beliefs 
that generated the observed behavior arose in the first place. 
Economic theory would benefit from a theory of belief formation, and, relatedly, from a 
classification of beliefs according to their rationality.  A theory of belief formation could 
suggest a systematic way of predicting which beliefs agents might hold in various 
environments.  Rationality of beliefs may serve as a tool for comparing the relative 
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plausibility of different equilibria in economic models.
7  Moreover, if we had a theory of 
how beliefs are formed, we might also use it to delineate the scope of competing models 
for representation of beliefs.  In particular, we would be able to tell when economic 
agents are likely to entertain probabilistic beliefs, and when their beliefs should be 
modeled in other, perhaps less structured ways. 
Because the Bayesian approach ignores the belief formation process, it appears to be too 
weak a standard of rationality.  The bulk of this paper is devoted to the converse claim, 
namely, that the Bayesian approach may also be too demanding in certain circumstances, 
and that rational decision makers need not always be Bayesian.  Thus, we hold that 
Bayesian beliefs are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality of belief. 
We do not define the notions of “belief” or of “rationality” in this paper.  Our main point 
is that “Bayesianism” does not satisfactorily capture the intuitive notion of “rational 
belief”.  Specifically, we claim that there are situations where Bayesian beliefs will not 
appear rational in an intuitive sense, and, conversely, there are situations in which beliefs 
that seem intuitively rational will fail to be Bayesian. 
We devote the next section to a definition of the concept of “Bayesianism” discussed and 
criticized in this article.  Its main goal is to bridge a culture gap and explain to non-
economists how economic theorists have come to think of “Bayesianism”.  Section 3 
argues that a rational agent who consciously evaluates the plausibility of events need not 
be Bayesian in this sense.  Thus, Section 3 attempts to show that, on cognitive grounds, 
rationality need not imply Bayesianism.  Section 4 is devoted to the claim that rational 
behavior implicitly defines Bayesian beliefs even if the agent is not aware of these 
beliefs.  It argues that rational behavior under uncertainty also does not imply the 
existence of (implicit) Bayesian beliefs.  Finally, we conclude by considering alternative 
approaches to the generation and representation of beliefs. 
Two caveats are in order.  First, some of the arguments mentioned in this paper have 
appeared previously in the literature (see references below).  Second, we discuss the 
notion of Bayesianism that is commonly used in economic theory.  As we explain below, 
it is a much more extreme variant of the Bayesian faith than those found in statistics, 
philosophy, or computer science.  Our critique is only directed at the economic version of 
Bayesianism. 
                                                 
7 In a sense, Cho-Kreps (1987) “intuitive criterion” and related belief-based refinements are among the few 
exceptions in which economic theory does dare to rule out certain beliefs on the grounds of irrationality.  
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2. What is Bayesianism? 
When economic theorists think of the term "Bayesian", they typically refer to four basic 
tenets: 
Grand State Space: In Savage's words, a state should "resolve all uncertainty", which 
implies that all possibly relevant causal relationships, and all that is known about the way 
information is obtained, are also specified in a "state".  Everyday theoretical work often 
ignores this principle, thereby simplifying the definition of the state space.  But whenever 
a conceptual difficulty is encountered, one resorts to a sufficiently elaborate state space to 
resolve it. 
Prior Probability:  (i) Whenever a fact is not known, one should have probabilistic beliefs 
about it.  (ii) These beliefs should be given by a single probability measure defined over a 
state space in which every state resolves all relevant uncertainty.   
Bayesian Updating: In light of new information, the Bayesian prior should be updated to 
a posterior according to Bayes’s law. 
Expected Utility: When facing a decision problem, one should maximize expected utility 
with respect to one’s Bayesian beliefs (incorporating all information that one has 
gathered). 
In statistics, philosophy, computer science, artificial intelligence, and related fields, 
Bayesianism typically means only the second and third tenets.  The two other tenets call 
for explication.   
We begin with the fourth tenet.  The other disciplines mentioned earlier often discuss 
beliefs, evidence, induction, and learning without an explicit reference to decision 
making, and thus they need not always specify a decision theory that accompanies the 
representation of beliefs.  As a result, they can do without the fourth tenet or any 
alternative thereof.  By contrast, economics is inherently interested in decision making, 
and it uses the representation of beliefs in order to predict or explain behavior.  The 
fourth tenet states how beliefs affect, or are at least reflected in behavior. 
Conversely, these behavioral implications can be the basis of an axiomatization of the 
Bayesian approach, coupled with expected utility maximization, as in Ramsey (1931), de 
Finetti (1937), and Savage (1954).  These works showed that if a decision maker satisfied 
certain assumptions on the ranking of alternatives in an uncertain environment, her 
behavior was consistent with the second and fourth tenets of Bayesianism above, namely, 
that she made decisions so as to maximize expected utility with respect to a probability 
measure.  One may, however, also provide behavioral axiomatizations of the Bayesian 
approach with other decision theories, such as prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 6 
1979).
8  Both types of axiomatization could also be used, in principle, for the elicitation 
of subjective probabilities based on behavior data. 
It is perhaps less natural that economics is the only discipline in which the dominant 
interpretation of “Bayesianism” adopts also the first tenet, according to which the state 
space is elaborate enough to be able to describe anything of relevance.  The roots of this 
belief may go back to the writings of de Finetti (1937), who was famous for his religious 
zeal when it came to the Bayesian faith.  Savage (1954) was referring to this 
interpretation of the Bayesian model, but seemed to be more pragmatic and skeptical 
about it.
9  It seems that Harsanyi (1967, 1968) greatly contributed to the acceptance of the 
first tenet in economics.  In these path-breaking works Harsanyi considered games of 
incomplete information, that is, games in which the utility functions and beliefs of the 
players may not be known to other players.  He suggested to analyze them as regular 
games in which, at the first stage, nature moves and selects the “types”, namely, utilities 
and beliefs, of all players.  In the following stages, players are called upon to make 
moves, where their information need not be perfect, as is standard in games.  Thus, in a 
trivial but brilliant modeling strategy, Harsanyi showed that game theorists who could 
deal with an element of risk in the models could also deal with unknown utilities or 
beliefs.  There was no conceptual difference between, say, not knowing whether the 
opponent in a game is altruistic, and not knowing which hand she was dealt in a game of 
Poker. 
Harsanyi’s idea could be described as going back in time before the players got their own 
identity, and imagining what kind of reasoning they might be engaged in at this “original 
position”.  This mental exercise can’t fail to remind us of Rawls’s (1973) “veil of 
ignorance”.  In fact, Harsanyi has already used the same modeling strategy in his defense 
of utilitarianism (Harsanyi, 1953), where he related utilitarianism to expected utility 
maximization in the “original position”. 
Harsanyi’s works have opened the way for game theory to deal with a host of economic 
phenomena that involved information asymmetries.  Equipped with this tool, economics 
could deal with many phenomena that were not formally modeled in the past, to analyze 
various “market failures”, and also to export game theoretic models to other disciplines.  
The belief that any interactive situation should be modeled as a “Bayesian game” has 
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9 In a tone that is half-caricaturizing his own argument, Savage explains that an “act” should be viewed as a 
strategy one adopts once and for all, before one is born.  His discussion elsewhere (including the notion of 
“small worlds”) shows that he might not have approved of the extreme interpretation which is today 
prevalent in economic theory. 7 
become standard in economics.  Coupled with the assumptions that all players also share 
the same prior distribution over the state space, it has come to be known as the “Harsanyi 
Doctrine”. 
Since the Harsanyi Doctrine came to dominate economics, generations of economic 
theorists were brought up on the proposition that the four tenets of Bayesianism are the 
basic way to analyze any problem of social interaction under uncertainty, as well as any 
problem involving uncertainty in general.  The Bayesian way of thinking offered a 
convenient framework that is almost algorithmic: one starts out with the state space, 
whose description should include anything that can possibly matter.  In case of doubt 
about the relevance of any conceivable course of uncertainty, it is brought forth and 
modeled explicitly as part of the definition of a “state”.  Next, a prior is formed, which 
allows one to weed out irrelevant states by assigning them probability zero.  Then the 
prior is updated based on new evidence, and if a decision has to be taken, it is taken so as 
to maximize expected utility. 
The current state of the art is that most economic theorists accept this as the way to 
analyze any problem.  For example, if we were to discuss the question of induction, and 
the formation of beliefs in rules from observations, the textbook economic approach 
would be to say that a state of the world specifies all observations that can ever be 
gathered, and thereby also the degree of accuracy of every rule than can ever be 
imagined.  Hence, defining the states “correctly”, there is no problem of induction – 
inductive inference is no more than Bayesian updating.  This, at least, is how economists 
model reasoning by rational agents.   
To consider another example, a well-trained economic theorist would not see the need for 
a concept such as Carnap’s confirmation function (Carnap, 1952), mapping evidence to 
probabilistic beliefs.  Rather, she would adopt the Grand State Space, in which every 
state specifies what this function is, and model the reasoner’s choice of the confirmation 
function by a prior belief over this state space.  Similarly, whereas Bayesian statisticians 
would use a prior belief over a parameter, but base the choice of a prior on theoretical 
considerations as well as on past experience, economic theory would model all such past 
experience as being reflected in the definition of the states, and any theoretical 
considerations in the prior beliefs.  If asked to justify this notion of rationality, the 
theorist would mention the axiomatic foundations – mostly Savage (1954) – as a 
convincing argument that, even when applied to an all-encompassing state space, agents 
should be Bayesian. 
3. Insufficient Information 
All four tenets of Bayesianism have come under attack, especially as descriptive theories.  
The most common critique of Bayesian principles in economics is the descriptive failure 
of the last tenet, namely that people maximize expected utility when they are equipped 8 
with probabilistic beliefs.  This critique began with Allais’s famous example in which a 
large proportion of people make choices that are inconsistent with expected utility 
theory
10, and continued with the behavioral deviations from EUT (expected utility theory) 
documented by Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  Much of the 
recent literature referred to as behavioral economics is based on this critique.  The third 
tenet of Bayesianism, namely, that beliefs should be updated in accordance with Bayes’s 
law, is almost unassailable from a normative viewpoint, when applied to the Grand State 
Space.
11  It has, however, also been shown to be descriptively lacking.  In fact, Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974) have shown that people often confound the conditional probability 
of A given B with that of B given A.  The second tenet, namely, that one has probabilistic 
beliefs over anything uncertain, has been shown by Ellsberg (1961) to be an inaccurate 
description of people’s behavior.
12  Here we are concerned with the combination of the 
first two tenets, and argue that, taken together, they are far from compelling, not only as a 
description of human behavior or reasoning, but also as a normative ideal.  More 
specifically, we accept the prevailing view in economic theory, according to which the 
most elegant way to think of uncertainty is to imagine the Grand State Space.  But we do 
not see a rational way to assign probabilities to this space.  Conversely, we have no 
quarrel with a Bayesian approach that assigns probabilities to a limited state space, 
especially if the latter has been encountered in similar problems in the past.  It is only the 
combination of the first two tenets that we find problematic as explained below. 
The main difficulty with assigning probability to the Grand State Space is that there is no 
information on which one can base the choice of prior beliefs.  Any information that one 
may obtain, and that may help in the choice of a prior, should, according to the first tenet, 
be incorporated into the description of the Grand State Space.  This means that the prior 
on this state has to specify beliefs one had before obtaining the information in question.  
Thus, the information may help one choose posterior beliefs (presumably according to 
Bayes's rule), but not prior beliefs.   
Even when considering a state space that is not all-encompassing, there are many 
problems in which there is simply not enough information to sensibly  generate 
probabilistic beliefs.  In these problems one may expect people to exhibit behavior that 
cannot be summarized by a single probability measure.  Moreover, when information is 
scarce, one may also reject the Bayesian approach on normative grounds, as did Knight 
(1921).  This normative failure is related to the limitation discussed above: the Bayesian 
paradigm does not offer a theory of (prior) belief generation.  It follows that, even if one 
                                                 
10  See Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green (1995), pp. 179-80. 
 
11 When a more modest state space is considered, other approaches are possible.  See Levi (1980). 
 
12 For completeness, we describe Ellsberg’s “paradox” in the appendix. 9 
were convinced that one would like to be Bayesian, the Bayesian approach does not 
provide the self-help tools necessary to become Bayesian if one isn’t already.   
The normative failure of the second tenet of Bayesianism (Prior Probability) stimulated a 
search for alternative axiomatically-based models of decision theory.  Schmeidler (1989) 
proposed a model with non-additive probabilities in which alternatives are ranked by 
Choquet expected utility.  Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) offered a model in which the 
decision maker entertains a set of priors, rather than a single one.  The decision rule they 
axiomatized is the maxmin expected utility rule: every act is evaluated by the worst 
possible expected utility it could obtain, ranging over the various priors in the set, and 
this minimal expected utility is maximized by the decision maker.
13,
14   
While the non-additive Choquet expected utility model and the maxmin expected utility 
model can be used to resolve Ellsberg’s paradox (1961), they were not motivated by the 
need to describe observed behavior, but rather by the a-priori argument that the Bayesian 
approach is too restrictive to satisfactorily represent the information one has. 
Consider the following example (Schmeidler, 1989).  You are faced with two coins, each 
of which is about to be tossed.  The first coin is yours.  You have tossed it, say, 1000 
times, and it has come up Heads 500 times, and Tails 500 times.  The second coin is 
presented to you by someone else, and you know nothing about it.  Let us refer to the first 
coin as “known”, and to the second as “unknown”.  Asked to assign probabilities to the 
known coin coming up Heads or Tails, it is only natural to estimate 50% for each, as 
these are the empirical frequencies gathered over a sizeable database.  When confronted 
with the same question regarding the unknown coin, however, no information is 
available, and relative frequencies do not help estimate probabilities.  But the second 
tenet of Bayesianism demands that both sides of the unknown coin be assigned 
probabilities, and that these probabilities add up to 1.  Symmetry suggests that these 
probabilities be 50% for each side.  Hence, you end up assigning the same probability 
estimates to the two sides of the unknown coin as you did for the two sides of the known 
coin.  Yet, the two 50%-50% distributions feel rather different.  In the case of the known 
coin, the distribution is based on a good deal of information that supports a symmetric 
assessment while in the case of the unknown coin the same estimates are based on the 
                                                 
13 Bewley (2002) also axiomatized a set of priors, but in his model the decision maker has a partial 
preference order, whereby one act is preferred to another only if it has a higher expected utility, according 
to each possible prior. 
14 Both models are behavioral, in that they rely on in-principle observed preferences, and derive a 
representation thereof, which need not describe any actual mental process.  Thus, Schmeidler (1989) 
suggests that people behave as if they maximize the Choquet integral with respect to a non-additive 
measure, and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) model decision makers that behave as if they are maximizing 
the minimal expected utility with respect to a set of priors.  Both representations allow a naïve cognitive 
interpretation, but they are also compatible with other cognitive processes that may result in behavior that 
satisfies the relevant axioms. 10 
absence of information.  The Bayesian approach does not permit a distinction between 
symmetry based on information and symmetry based on lack of information. 
One may embed this example in a decision problem, and predict choices as in Ellsberg’s 
paradox.  But it is important that the example above does not involve decision making.  
The point of departure of Schmeidler (1989) is not the descriptive failures of subjective 
EUT.  Rather, it is what one might call a sense of cognitive unease with the manner that 
the Bayesian paradigm deals with absence of information.  This cognitive unease points 
also to the normative failure of the Bayesian approach in this example.  Even if one 
wished to become Bayesian, and even if one were willing to change one’s choices so as 
to conform to the Bayesian paradigm, one must ignore the amount of information that 
was the basis of the prior beliefs. 
The examples of Ellsberg and Schmeidler are simple in a way that might be misleading.  
These examples exhibit enough symmetries to suggest a natural prior via Laplace’s 
“principle of insufficient reason”.  If one wished to become Bayesian, one could 
comfortably assign 50% probability to each color in Ellsberg’s two-urn experiment, and, 
similarly, 50% to each side of the unknown coin in Schmeidler’s example.  In both cases, 
the 50%-50% distribution is the only prior that respects the symmetry in the problem, and 
it is therefore a natural candidate for one’s beliefs.  Hence, considering these examples in 
isolation, one might conclude that, cognitive unease aside, it is fairly easy to become 
Bayesian even if one was not born Bayesian. 
Unfortunately, most decision problems encountered in real life do not possess sufficient 
symmetries for the principle of insufficient reason to uniquely identify a prior.  Consider, 
for example, the uncertainty about an impending war.  One cannot seriously suggest that 
the relative frequency of wars in the past may serve as a good estimate of the probability 
of a war at the present.  The occurrence of wars cannot be viewed as repeated identical 
and independent repetitions of the same experiment, and consequently the question of 
war is an example of uncertainty, rather than of risk.  Applying Laplace’s principle of 
insufficient reason would suggest that war has 50% probability, independent of the 
circumstances.  But we know enough about war and peace to dismiss the symmetry 
between them.  Indeed, we can reason at length about the likelihood of war, to have 
sufficient reason to reject the principle of insufficient reason. 
To sum, a major failure of the Bayesian approach is that many real-life problems do not 
offer sufficient information to suggest a prior probability.  In a small fraction of these 
problems there are symmetries that suggest a unique prior based on the principle of 
insufficient reason.  But the vast majority of decision problems encountered by economic 
agents fall into a gray area, where there is too much information to arbitrarily adopt a 
symmetric prior, yet too little information to justifiably adopt a statistically-based prior. 11 
Justification of beliefs by evidence offers a criterion for rationality that need not rank 
highly specified beliefs as more rational than less specified ones.  While it is irrational to 
be agnostic and ignore evidence, it may also be irrational to hold probabilistic beliefs that 
are not grounded in evidence and are therefore arbitrary.  As in the case of scientific 
work, which aspires to rationality, there are claims that science has established, and there 
are hypotheses about which science is silent.  A high standard of rationality would 
require not only that one would not reject established facts, but also that one would not 
insist on claims that are unfounded.    
4. Behavioral derivations of Bayesianism 
The limitations of the Bayesian approach mentioned above are cognitive in spirit: they 
deal with the degree to which a mathematical model captures our intuition when 
reasoning about uncertainty.  The standard approach in economics, however, would find 
these cognitive limitations hardly relevant.  Modern economic theory follows logical 
positivism in viewing intentionally named concepts such as “utility” and “belief” as 
theoretical constructs that must be derived from observations.  The revealed preference 
paradigm further holds that only observed choices are legitimate observations for 
economics, ruling out other sources of information such as introspection and subjective 
reports of preferences and likelihood judgments.  Importantly, the derivations of 
subjective EUT by Ramsey, de Finetti, and Savage are consistent with this approach: they 
formulate axioms on (in-principle) observable choices, and show that these axioms are 
equivalent to a representation of choice by expected utility maximization according to a 
subjective probability measure.   
Many economic theorists believe that the behavior of rational agents satisfies (say) 
Savage’s axioms, and consequently that these agents behave as if they were maximizing 
expected utility with respect to an implicit Bayesian prior.  Thus, a prevalent view is that 
rationality necessitates Bayesianism.  Further, since the axioms identify the prior 
uniquely, this is often interpreted as revealed preferences being sufficient to elicit the 
beliefs of rational agents, namely, to measure their prior explicitly.   
The claim that rational agents must follow Savage’s axioms is often justified by 
arguments relying on “Dutch books” or on evolutionary reasoning.  Both types of 
arguments suggest that individuals who violate the axioms will be “driven out” of the 
market.  
In this section we argue that rational behavior need not imply Savage’s axioms.  We start 
by discussing two possible interpretations of a “preference order” and analyzing the 
axioms in light of these interpretations.  We argue that under neither interpretation are the 
axioms a necessary implication of rationality.  Further, we claim that eliciting a Bayesian 
prior from behavior is not always a viable option.  Finally, we comment briefly on the 
weaknesses of “Dutch books” and evolutionary arguments. 12 
4.1 Raw preferences and reasoned choice 
We will address both the descriptive and the normative interpretation of Savage’s 
axioms.
15  It will be more efficient to divide the discussion along different lines.   
Consider a binary relation representing preferences, or choices, as in Savage’s theory.  
This relation can be interpreted in (at least) two ways.  First, it might reflect raw 
preferences, namely, an instinctive tendency to prefer one alternative over another.  For 
example, the decision maker may choose a piece of chocolate cake over a bowl of 
broccoli without thinking.  Alternatively, the same binary relation might model reasoned 
choice, namely, choice that was arrived at by a process of reasoning.  When asked to 
choose between a lottery that pays $10 if the Democrats win both houses of Congress in 
the next election (and nothing otherwise) and a lottery that pays $5 if the Republicans 
win both houses in the next election (and nothing otherwise), a decision maker is likely to 
think about the choices before deciding.  Roughly, the decision maker exhibits raw 
preferences if she first acts, and then possibly observes her own act and stops to think 
about it.  The decision maker is involved in reasoned choice if she first thinks, then 
decides how to act. 
A descriptive interpretation of preferences in Savage’s model may be either one of raw 
preferences or of reasoned choice.  When describing reality, one must cope with the fact 
that in certain decision problems the decision maker acts before (or without) thinking, 
whereas in others she may reason her way to a decision.  By contrast, a normative 
interpretation of Savage’s theory deals with reasoned choice: if one attempts to convince 
a decision maker to change her decision(s), one would normally provide reasons to do so.   
In the following two sub-sections we consider raw preferences and reasoned choice 
separately, and argue that Savage’s axioms need not hold under either interpretation of 
“preferences”. 
4.2 Derivation of Bayesianism from raw preferences  
There is ample evidence that raw preferences often do not satisfy Savage’s axioms.  The 
evidence ranges from Ellsberg’s experiments, attacking a specific axiom, to the works of 
Kahneman and Tversky, questioning nearly every canon of rationality, explicit or implicit 
in the theory.  Many economists take this evidence to mean that economic agents are not 
always rational, but they still hold that rational economic agents would satisfy the 
axioms.  It is this claim that we take issue with.  Hence, we do not resort to the 
“behavioral” argument that Savage’s axioms are violated in practice.  Rather, we hold 
that raw preferences of an individual we would like to think of as “rational” may still 
deviate from Savage’s ideal.  We propose two main arguments: first, we argue that in the 
                                                 
15 The same discussion can be conducted in the context of any other behavioral axiomatization of 
Bayesianism.  We choose to refer to Savage as his is, justifiably, the most well-known axiomatization. 13 
face of uncertainty, the very notion of raw preferences may be in conflict with rationality.  
Second, we point out that the unobservability of the state space makes the meaning of 
Savage’s axioms vague, and renders impossible the elicitation of beliefs from choices.   
Rational choices follow beliefs 
We hold that economic agents, rational as they may be, only have raw preferences in 
certain domains.  There are many questions of interest to economic analysis, where 
agents’ preferences simply do not exist prior to thinking.  Moreover, there is nothing 
inherent in rationality that necessitates that raw preferences exist in all possible choice 
situations.  To the contrary, it often appears more rational to base choices on explicit 
beliefs. 
We do not claim that raw preferences are necessarily incompatible with rationality.   
People typically know which dish is tastier without having to deduce or compute their 
preference relation between dishes.  In this sense, “preference needs no inference” 
(Zajonc, 1980).  Such preferences can certainly be compatible with utility maximization 
or any other behavioral standard of rationality.  Moreover, in such cases one may indeed 
use an axiomatic derivation to justify and even calibrate a theoretical model.  In the 
example of preferences between dishes, one may satisfy the axioms of completeness and 
transitivity without being aware of one’s own utility function.  One may first observe 
one’s own choices between dish A and dish B, and then infer that her utility for the 
former is higher than for the latter.  Inferring utility from observed choices is, indeed, the 
standard interpretation of a consumer’s utility function. 
It is also possible that an agent would observe her own behavior, and subsequently learn 
what her implicit beliefs are.  A driver who buckles up only when she drives on a 
highway might infer that she assigns a higher probability to the event of a serious 
accident when driving on the highway as compared to city driving, without explicitly 
estimating probabilities.  However, it seems more rational to first consider the danger of 
accident, and then to decide whether to buckle up, rather than vice versa.  Yet some 
routine behaviors may be rational without requiring explicit reasoning, mostly because 
they are familiar. 
But many decision situations of interest are novel.  For example, suppose Bob must make 
decisions whose outcomes depend on the possibility of a nuclear war in Asia in the next 
five years.  Specifically, he is asked whether he prefers to get an outcome x if such a war 
erupts, and an outcome y otherwise, to, say, a sure outcome z.  Bob cannot be expected to 
have a-priori preferences over these choices.  In fact, it would appear highly irrational to 
have such preferences.  Rather, he would stop and ponder, and only after assessing the 
probability of war can he meaningfully answer these preference questions.  Furthermore, 
this would seem the only rational way to generate preferences in this problem. 14 
Those decision situations in which one has raw preferences from which beliefs may be 
inferred appear to be precisely those situations that are repeated often enough to allow the 
definition of beliefs by empirical frequencies.  By contrast, in situations that are novel or 
unique, where one does not have sufficient information to generate a prior, one also does 
not have preferences that precede beliefs. 
The revealed preference approach suggests that any observed choice manifests implicit 
preference.  For example, if Bob has not decided to bet on the eruption of war, this will 
be taken to be a manifestation of certain beliefs about war, whether Bob thought about 
this decision or not.  This default definition of “preferences” will guarantee that 
preferences exist, but it guarantees neither that they satisfy Savage’s axioms, nor that 
they appear “rational” in any intuitive sense. 
The unobservability of preferences 
The notion of “observability” in decision and economic theory allows some freedom of 
interpretation.  Most theories in economics and in related disciplines have paradigmatic 
applications, which leave little room for multiple interpretations.  For example, it is 
convenient to think of Savage’s axioms in the context of bets on a color of a ball drawn at 
random from an urn.  In this context, the states of the world are clearly defined by the 
balls in the urn.  Choices made contingent on the color of the ball drawn can be thought 
of as direct observations of a preference relation in a Savage-type model.  However, most 
economic applications of subjective EUT do not have such a clearly defined state space 
and further, it is often not clear what state space the decision maker has in mind.  The 
following example illustrates the difficulty. 
Assume that we observe Mary deciding to quit her job and take another.  This decision 
involves uncertainty and can be couched in a Savage-type model.  A state of the world in 
such a model should specify the values of all variables that may be relevant to Mary’s 
choice.  For instance, a state should be sufficiently detailed to determine Mary’s salary in 
a year’s time, both in her previous job and in the new job.  One might also wish to 
include the expertise Mary might acquire on the job, her likely co-workers, the economic 
stability of her employer, her own job security, and a number of other variables, for any 
time horizon that one considers relevant to the problem.  Moreover, the set of states of the 
world should also allow all possible causal relationships between Mary’s actions and 
these variables.  For example, a reasonable model should be rich enough to express the 
possibility that with one employer Mary’s promotion is practically guaranteed, while with 
another it depends on her effort level.  The nature of the causal relationship between 
effort and promotion is also subject to uncertainty, and should therefore also be specified 
by each state of the world. 
These considerations give rise to two difficulties.  First, the state space becomes large and 
complicated, and with it the set of conceivable acts defined on this state space in 15 
Savage’s model.  Second, it is not at all clear which of the above uncertainties should be 
taken into account in our model.  Hence, after observing Mary’s choice, we may 
construct many different Savage-type models in which her choice is modeled as a 
preference between two acts.  But in each such model there will be many other pairs of 
acts, the choice between which was not observed.  Clearly, if the states of the world 
themselves are unobservable, one cannot hope to observe a complete binary relation 
between all the acts defined on these states. 
A possible solution to the second problem would be to define an exhaustive state space, 
within which one may embed every conceivable state space that might be relevant to the 
problem.  But such a solution aggravates the first problem.  Moreover, it renders most 
pairwise choices inherently unobservable.  To see this, imagine that one defines the set of 
outcomes to include all conceivable consequences, over any time horizon.  One then 
proceeds to define states as all possible functions from acts to outcomes.  This would 
result in an exhaustive, canonical state space.  Next, one must define all the conceivable 
acts (Savage, 1954): all possible functions from states to outcomes.  Over this set of 
conceivable outcomes one assumes that a complete binary relation is observable, and that 
the observed choices would satisfy Savage’s axioms.  But such a relation cannot be 
observable even in principle.  In this states are functions from actual acts to outcomes, 
and conceivable acts are functions from these states to the same set of outcomes.  Thus 
the set of conceivable acts is by two orders of magnitude larger than the set of acts that 
are actually available in the problem.  This implies that the vast majority of the binary 
choices assumed in Savage’s model are not observable, even in principle.  
Savage’s theory has a clear observable meaning in experiments involving simple set-ups 
such as balls drawn out of urns, but in many economic applications of EUT the state 
space is not directly observable, and hence Savage’s behavioral axioms do not have a 
clear meaning in observable terms.  There are two implications of this.  First, in many 
situations of interest it will be impossible to elicit prior beliefs from raw preferences.  
Second, the claim that rational agents have preferences that satisfy Savage’s axioms 
becomes ill-defined.  Since there are many possible Savage-style models in which the 
decision problem can be couched, the claim should be re-stated as holding that there 
exists a Savage-style model in which a rational agent satisfies the axioms.  But this 
existential claim is quite weak, and perhaps vacuous. 16 
4.3 Derivation of Bayesianism from reasoned choice
16  
We now turn to the interpretation of a preference relation as describing reasoned choice.  
We argue that also under this interpretation rationality need not imply compliance with 
Savage’s axioms, and that elicitation of beliefs from choices is not always possible. 
Reasoned choice need not be complete 
The completeness axiom is typically justified by necessity: one must make a decision, 
and whatever one chooses will be viewed as the preferred act.  This argument seems to 
apply to observed preferences.  Indeed, if one defines preference by observations, the 
completeness axiom is rather weak, but when we consider reasoned choice, there is no 
compelling argument for completeness. 
To see this point more clearly, consider first the case of transitivity.  If there is a reason to 
prefer f to g, and if there is a reason to prefer g to h, then these two reasons may be 
combined to provide a reason to prefer f to h.  The transitivity axiom may actually be 
viewed as a reasoning axiom, providing an argument, or a justification for a certain 
preference.  It can thus be used to infer certain preferences from others.  Similarly, three 
other axioms in Savage’s framework can be viewed as templates for reasoning that a 
certain act should be preferred to another.  Specifically, Savage's sure thing principle 
suggests that, if preference hold between two acts that are equal on a given event, then 
the same preference should hold between another pair of acts, which are also equal on 
that event and are unchanged off that event.  Savage's monotonicity axiom states that, if 
we replace the outcome that an act f yields on an event A by a better outcome, the 
modified act should be preferred to the original one.  The fourth axiom of Savage that can 
be viewed as a reasoning axiom relates preferences for betting on an event A vs. betting 
on an event B, where the two pairs of acts involved vary the notion of "good" and "bad" 
outcomes involved in the bet.  All these axioms can help reach a decision about what 
one's preferences between two acts should be, given one's preferences between other 
pairs of acts. 
17 
The same cannot be said of the completeness axiom.  The completeness axioms states 
that (reasoned) choice should be defined between any two acts f and g, but it provides no 
help in finding reasons to prefer f to g or vice versa. 
                                                 
16 See Shafer (1986) for related arguments. 
17 Savage employed three additional axioms. The first only requires that preferences be non-trivial, and is 
needed to fix a unique probability measure of the decision maker, while the other two axioms are continuity 
axioms.  While such axioms can also be viewed as part of reasoned choice, namely, as helping one 
complete one's own preferences, for the purposes of the present discussion we focus on those that are more 
fundamental from a conceptual viewpoint.  17 
If one views Savage’s axioms as conditions on raw preferences, the completeness axiom 
may be mentioned as a half-axiom barely worth mentioning.  Completeness in this set-up 
is one of two requirements in Savage’s first axiom, which is well-accepted in consumer 
theory and in choice under certainty.  But if the Savage axioms are viewed as conditions 
for reasoned choice, the completeness axiom plays an altogether different role: it is 
contrasted with all the rest.  The completeness axiom defines the question, namely, what 
are the reasoned preferences between pairs of acts, and all the rest are part of the answer, 
that is, potential reasons that may come to bear in determining preferences between 
particular pairs of acts. 
How should we model rational choice when there are no obvious reasons to assume 
preferences are complete? One possibility is to adhere to purely reasoned choice, namely 
to choice that can be justified.  This will result in relaxation of the completeness axiom, 
as was suggested by Bewley (2002).  Another approach is to model explicitly the choice 
that will eventually be made, and thus to retain the completeness axiom, but to relax 
some of the other axioms that might not be as compelling under uncertainty.  The 
resulting model attempts to describe the choice that will eventually be made, even if it 
cannot be fully justified.  (See Schmeidler, 1989, and Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989.)  The 
two approaches agree that reasoned choice need not be complete.  Both admit that 
rationality does not imply Savage’s axioms. 
Computational complexity 
When decision problems do not present themselves to the decision maker with a clearly 
defined state space, the generation of all relevant states involves insurmountable 
computational difficulties.  For example, assume that a contract involves n binary 
conditions.  The state space used to analyze it would need to have 2
n states.  Imagining 
these states and reasoning about their likelihood may prove a daunting cognitive task.  A 
similar argument can be made for finding regularities in given databases.  In fact, some of 
these problems can be proved to be “difficult” in a precise sense (see Aragonès, Gilboa, 
Postlewaite, and Schmeidler (2005)).  Because certain problems are computationally so 
complex as to prohibit a solution by the most advanced computers in existence, it also 
appears unlikely that rational economic agents can solve them.   Just as rational economic 
agents do not play chess optimally, they cannot be assumed to solve problems that 
computer scientists cannot solve. 
Other difficulties 
The elicitation of beliefs from reasoned choice encounters two additional problems that 
were discussed also for raw preferences.  First, the observability problem means, for 
reasoned choice, that it is not clear which state space the agent has in mind.  Resorting to 
a canonical state space may not reflect the agent’s reasoning, and it would also mean that 
defining one’s preference relation requires a large degree of hypothetical reasoning.   18 
Second, reasoned choice might contradict other axioms of Savage, beyond the 
completeness axiom.  While these axioms are themselves reasons for a particular 
preference, they may generate conflicting preferences.  The only known algorithm that 
would guarantee a resolution of these conflicts in a way that satisfies the axioms would 
be to select a probability and a utility function and to make decisions in accordance with 
EUT.  This, however, brings us back to the task of specifying a prior directly, and would 
be a failure of the attempt to derive prior beliefs from choices. 
4.4.  Dutch books and evolution 
The “Dutch book” or “money pump” arguments suggest that a violation of a certain 
axiom would lead one to lose money with certainty.  For example, having cyclical (strict) 
preference, say, of a over b, b over c, and c over a, one is exposed to a sequence of 
trades, where one pays a small amount for exchanging one’s choice for a preferred 
alternative, ending up with the original choice but with less money.  The possibility of 
such a “money pump” would presumably lure a shrewd bookie who would drive the 
intransitive agent into bankruptcy and out of the market. 
This argument seems to rely on a rather extreme interpretation of a preference relation as 
describing an agent’s choices under all circumstances, irrespective of context.  If, for 
instance, and agent commits to making decisions via a computer program, and the latter 
exhibits cyclical preferences, the agent may indeed lose money due to a “Dutch book”.  
But real people would notice that something is wrong way before they are driven into 
destitution.  A more realistic interpretation of a preference order would be that it tends to 
predict actual choices made under normal circumstances.  The exploitation of preferences 
by a bookie is likely to change these very preferences when interacting with the 
hypothetical bookie.  It does not mean that these preferences are unrealistic in other 
contexts. 
A more serious argument is offered by evolutionary reasoning.  Here one does not posit a 
bookie who exploits a particular agent’s preferences, but relies on a long-term process, in 
which various decision situations naturally suggest themselves to the agent, and where, 
asymptotically, violation of certain axioms might lead to sub-optimal results.  The latter 
are assumed to drive the preferences in question into extinction, relying on processes of 
replication, say, under imitation. 
These evolutionary arguments are not as compelling as they might appear.  The main 
reason is that a precise formulation of the evolutionary process requires sufficient 
repetitions of choice situations in similar environments.  Indeed, when choice situations 
repeat themselves one may have sufficient information to generate probabilistic beliefs.  
It is precisely when one confronts novel situations, and does not have sufficient 
information for the generation of such beliefs, that the evolutionary arguments appear the 
weakest.   19 
5. Conclusion 
Economic research tends to assume that agents who face uncertainty are Bayesian, that is, 
that they behave as if they intended to maximize expected utility with respect to a 
subjective probability measure, which is updated according to Bayes’s rule when new 
information is obtained.  This assumption has been challenged experimentally by 
Ellsberg (1961).  Indeed, in recent years alternative models, such as Choquet expected 
utility (Schmeidler, 1989) and maxmin expected utility with multiple priors (Gilboa and 
Schmeidler, 1989) have been used in economic applications ranging from finance and 
game theory to labor economics, international trade, and macroeconomics.
18 
Many economists are willing to accept the need for non-Bayesian models in order to 
improve the accuracy of economic theories.  They view non-Bayesian decision making as 
a form of “bounded rationality” that should be sprinkled into a theory to make it 
descriptively more accurate, as one may provide better predictions by introducing 
hyperbolic discounting, mental accounting, or other biases and mistakes that are being 
incorporated into “behavioral” economic models.  Our claim in this paper is different.  
We do not focus on descriptive failures of the Bayesian approach, but on its normative 
inadequacies.  We challenge the Bayesian approach as the gold standard of rationality. 
While we do not offer a definition of “rationality”, the preceding discussion suggests a 
distinction among three levels of rationality, as applied to choice or to belief.  At the 
highest level choices and beliefs are reasoned, namely: the individual can defend and 
justify them by appeal to objective evidence.  At the next level decisions and beliefs are 
not justified by evidence, but are not in conflict with evidence.  This category may 
include raw preferences that are robust to the reasoning process.  Finally, irrational 
beliefs are those that are contradicted by evidence.  Similarly, irrational choices are those 
that are in conflict with reason, and that may well be changed as a result of the reasoning 
process. 
The behavioral failure of Savage’s theory in the case of Ellsberg’s experiments is not 
“irrational” in this sense.  There is substantial evidence that individuals prefer to bet with 
known probabilities rather than with unknown ones, even after the sure thing principle 
has been explained to them.  We have argued, however, that taking the higher standard of 
rationality, that is, of reasoned beliefs and reasoned choice, one may end up with non-
                                                 
18 Dow and Werlang (1992) were the first to apply such models to finance, explaining why an individual 
may wish neither to buy nor to sell an asset for a range of prices.  Epstein and Wang (1994, 1995) and 
Epstein and Schneider (2003) have extended the theory to a dynamic setting and used it to explain stock 
markets booms and crashes.  Mukerji (1998) applied the theory to explain incompleteness of contracts.  
Epstein and Miao (2002) and Alonso (2005) use these models to explain the “home bias” phenomenon.  
Ozaki and Nishimura (2002) use the theory to explain why uncertainty, as opposed to risk, decreases an 
unemployed individual’s search time.  Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2003, 2006) used these models, and 
ideas from robust control theory, to develop a new approach to macroeconomic theory.  20 
Bayesian beliefs.  It is sometimes more rational to admit that one does not have sufficient 
information for probabilistic beliefs than to pretend that one does.    
Much of this paper was devoted to the claim that rationality of beliefs does not 
necessitate a probabilistic representation thereof.  This argument was made on cognitive 
as well as on behavioral grounds, where behavior could mean raw preferences or 
reasoned choice, and could be interpreted descriptively or normatively.  As argued in the 
introduction, the converse is also false: probabilistic beliefs may not be rational in any 
intuitive sense of the world.  These two claims converge on the need to model the way 
beliefs are formed.  A theory of belief formation will help us determine which Bayesian 
beliefs are rational, and will also indicate when it is rational to hold Bayesian beliefs in 
the first place.  21 
Appendix: Ellsberg’s Paradox 
 
One of Ellsberg’s “paradoxes” is the following.  There are two urns.  Urn 1 contains 100 
balls, each of which is known to be either red or black, but you have no information 
about how many of the balls are red and how many are black.  Urn 2 contains 50 red balls 
and 50 black balls.  A red bet is a bet that the ball drawn at random is red and a black 
bet is the bet that it is black.  In either case, winning the bet, namely, guessing the color 
of the ball correctly, yields $100.  First, you are asked, for each of the urns, if you prefer 
a red bet or a black bet.  For each urn separately, most people say that they are indifferent 
between the red and the black bet. 
Then you are asked whether you prefer a red bet on urn 1 or a red bet on urn 2. Many 
people say that they would strictly prefer to bet on urn 2, the urn with known 
composition. The same pattern of preferences in exhibited for black bets (as, indeed, 
would follow from transitivity of preferences given that one is indifferent between the 
betting on the two colors in each urn).  That is, people seem to prefer betting on an 
outcome with a known probability of 50% than on an outcome whose probability can be 
anywhere between 0 and 100%.  
It is easy to see that the pattern of choices described above cannot be explained by 
expected utility maximization for any specification of subjective probabilities.  Such 
probabilities would have to reflect the belief that it is more likely that a red ball will be 
drawn from urn 2 than from urn 1, and that it is more likely that a black ball will be 
drawn from urn 2 than from urn 1.  This is impossible because in each urn the 
probabilities of the two colors have to add up to one.  Thus, Ellsberg's findings suggest 
that many people are not subjective expected utility maximizers.  Moreover, the 
assumption that comes under attack is not the expected utility hypothesis per se: any rule 
that employs probabilities in a reasonable way would also be at odds with Ellsberg's 
results.  The questionable assumption here is the second tenet of Bayesianism, namely, 
that all uncertainty can be quantified in a probabilistic way.  Exhibiting preferences for 
known vs. unknown probabilities is incompatible with the second tenet of Bayesianism.  
Ellsberg’s paradox and Schmeidler’s two-coin example are simple illustrations of the 
distinction Knight made between “risk” and “uncertainty”.  These examples demonstrate 
that Savage’s axioms may fail in descriptive theories.  Specifically, Savage imposes the 
“sure thing principle” (axiom P2), which states the following.  Should two possible acts, f 
and g, yield precisely the same outcomes if an event A does not occur, then the 
preference between f and g should only depend on their outcomes given A.  That is, if we 
were to modify these acts outside of A, in such a way that they are still equal to each 
other, then the preferences between the modified acts should be the same as between the 
original ones.  This axiom appears very compelling: if the two acts are anyway equal off 22 
A, why should one care what they are equal to?  It seems natural to ignore the values of 
the acts when they are equal, and to focus on the event in which differences among them 
might emerge.  Yet, it can be seen that the behavior exhibited in Ellsberg's paradox 
violates this axiom as would a decision maker who prefers to bet on a known coin rather 
than on an unknown one in Schmeidler's example.   
To see why P2 is violated in these examples, let the state space have four states, each 
specifying the outcome of a draw from the known urn I as well as the outcome of a draw 
from the unknown urn II (even though only a draw from one urn is possible).   For 
example, the first state might be denoted I-R;II-R, suggesting that a draw from urn I 
would result in a red ball, and so will a draw from urn II.   Similarly, we have three more 
states: I-R;II-B I-B;II-R and I-B;II-B.  Respecting this order of the states, each act is 
associated with a vector consisting of four outcomes.  Let f be the act "betting on Red in 
urn I", which is associated with the vector of outcomes (1,1,0,0) (that is, winning in the 
first state, I-R;II-R, and the second state, I-R;II-B, and losing in the other two states).  Let 
g be the act "betting on Red in urn II", whose vector of outcomes is (1,0,1,0).  Acts f and 
g are equal on the event { I-R;II-R   I-B;II-B } (to 1 in the first state and to 0 in the 
second).  P2 would suggest that, if we were to modify both f and g on this event to 0 and 
1 (instead of 1 and 0), preferences between them would not change.  But in this case the 
modified f is associated with (0,1,0,1), that is, it is the act "betting on Black in urn II", 
whereas the modified g, (0,0,1,1), is the act "betting on Black in urn I", and the 
preferences between these are reversed.  Intuitively, the modification of act f changed it 
from a risky act, whose distribution is known, to an uncertain (or “ambiguous”) act, 
whose distribution is not known.  In the case of act g, the same modification changed an 
uncertain act into a risky one.  This asymmetry may explain why people violate P2 in this 
example, and often feel comfortable with this violation even when the logic of the axiom 
is explained to them.  23 
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